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ABSTRACT 
Securities law in the United States has a unique approach to defining what is a 
security and what is not a security. It includes broadly defined terminology and 
describes several investment instruments that may be considered a security. 
Courts use one of two methods to determine whether an investment contract is a 
security: the Howey Test and the Risk Capital Test. 
Initial Coin Offerings are one of the most recent instruments that courts and other 
governmental organizations need to examine in order to answer whether they 
meet the criteria of being a security. Depending on the result, the issuers may 
need to take certain actions, or they will have to bear the consequences. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the courts have been trying to interpret 
existing securities law in terms of this new instrument. However, courts, 
governmental institutions, companies, and individuals do not have specific 
answers as to whether or not these offerings are securities. 
Since many Initial Coin Offerings remain within the area of securities law, there 
are solutions for issuers who want to avoid severe consequences. First, the Initial 
Coin Offeror can choose to apply for exemptions from registration. The issuer 
can also structure the token in such a way that courts and governmental 
institutions could not consider the token to be a security. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I began this research because of my interest in crypto-currencies and a specific means by 
which entrepreneurs have begun to use them to raise funds for crypto-based project development.  
While I was in the LL.M. program at Indiana University Maurer School of Law, a surge of new 
offerings in crypto-currencies allowed entrepreneurs to raise significant sums of equity or capital 
with which to build their businesses. The manner of these offerings became known as “Initial 
Coin Offerings” (ICOs) because the entrepreneurs offered to sell “tokens” representing one coin 
to members of the public. Though they were able to find investors willing to buy these tokens, 
the issuers of these tokens tripped over federal and state securities laws in the United States and 
attracted the attention of federal and state regulators and law enforcement agencies. In some 
cases, the issuers were sued by their customers for selling what the customers have argued—and 
regulators have acknowledged—may be securities under federal or state law definitions of the 
term “securities,” which violates laws designed to protect the investing public. 
Although most of the funds raised by sales under these ICOs were collected from 
investors in the United States, investors in other nations were also investing in ICOs. This 
prompted me to want to explore whether, and to what extent, U.S. federal or state securities laws 
apply to ICOs.  This led me to the central questions in this thesis:  
1.) Are all ICOs governed by U.S. federal or state securities laws?  
2.) If not, then how do crypto-entrepreneurs know when they must comply with federal 
or state securities laws before they become the subjects of federal or state 
investigations or defendants in lawsuits brought by their customers?  
3.) Do regulations promulgated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
help some ICO issuers by exempting them from full “registration” of their offerings 
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with the SEC and from the obligations on issuers of “securities” to disclose key facts 
about their businesses when they offer to sell equity to the public?  
In addition to these important questions about U.S. laws, my research interests extend to 
the manner in which ICOs might be viewed by other governments around the world.  This thesis, 
however, focuses on the key aspects of U.S. securities laws and exemptions from their effect that 
have been developed over more than 75 years, the manner in which courts in the U.S. have 
viewed the key term “securities” in this regulatory scheme in the past, and how ICOs might 
benefit or suffer from that regulatory and case law history.  This thesis does not discuss non-U.S. 
securities laws, in part because I hope to make that the subject of future research.  
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, I evaluate the longest-standing judicial interpretation of the 
term “securities” under the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act) announced by the United States Supreme Court in Securities and 
Exchange Commission v. W. J. Howey Co. in 1946:1   
The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, 
security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of 
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, 
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, 
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided 
interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or 
privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities 
(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, 
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange 
relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly 
known as a “security”, or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary 
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe 
to or purchase, any of the foregoing.2 
 
The Court – relying on the definition in 15 USCS § 77b – held that  
                                                 
1 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). 
2 15 U.S.C.S. § 77b (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-281, approved 12/1/18). 
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the term “security” covered any offering to the general public that met the 
following criteria: an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act 
means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a 
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the 
promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise 
are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets 
employed in the enterprise.3  
 
I also examine which courts are interpreting state “blue sky” laws and have held that tokens are 
“securities” under those laws.  
In Chapter 2, I examine the facts in several ICOs since 2016 that have attracted attention 
either from regulators as law enforcement agencies or from investors.  I also explain how, in my 
opinion, these ICOs do or do not qualify as “securities” under the definitions in the 1933 Act and 
1934 Act.   
In Chapter 3, I analyze four different tokens in terms of the positions taken by the SEC, 
state law enforcement agencies, and the courts. I think that these tokens are essential in the 
formation of token securities law. 
In Chapter 4, I set forth the only means for escaping the registration-and-disclosure 
requirements of the 1933 Act and 1934 Act, which is to offer a token that does not qualify as a 
“security” under the Acts as interpreted in Howey or to offer tokens in a manner that qualifies for 
several statutory and regulatory “exemptions” to those Acts.   
In the Conclusion, I offer preliminary advice to entrepreneurs who plan to offer their 
tokens in the United States, but do not want to be subject to the requirements of the 1933 Act, the 
1934 Act, or state “blue sky” laws.  In this set of conclusions, I urge attention to the exemptions 
to registration that are available to issuers who offer tokens in the United States.  
 
  
                                                 
3 Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99. 
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CHAPTER 1: INVESTMENT CONTRACTS 
1.1 Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
To be covered under the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act) or the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), the offering and resulting assets must be deemed to be “securities.” 
The definition of the term “security” is intentionally broad, and courts in the United States have 
been interpreting the term liberally for more than 80 years.   
Does it matter whether an offering qualifies as a “security” or not? The answer is yes. 
The presence of a security in a transaction leads to some regulatory consequences under the 1934 
Act.  For this reason, it is essential to look at the factors that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and U.S. courts use when determining whether the offering falls under the 
definitions provided in the 1933 and 1934 Acts.  
This section will first explain the differences between the definitions of a “security” in 
the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act.  Next, it will focus on the definition of the term “investment 
contract,” a term used in both Acts, and the manner in which the SEC and U.S. courts have 
interpreted that term in order to bring offerings that do not otherwise fit within the parameters of 
other terms under the definitions of “security” in the Acts.  The “investment contract” definition 
and judicial gloss added since the 1930’s are particularly helpful to determine when “initial coin 
offerings (ICOs)” qualify as “securities” governed by the 1933 and 1934 Acts, which is the core 
work of this thesis.  
1.2 Definition of Security 
The Securities Act of 1933 defines the term “security” as follows: 
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When used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires— The term 
‘‘security’’ means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based 
swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or 
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, 
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment 
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional 
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, 
or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities 
(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, 
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange 
relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly 
known as a ‘‘security’’, or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary 
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe 
to or purchase, any of the foregoing.4 
 
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 similarly defines the term “security” as:  
any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, 
debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement 
or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, 
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment 
contract, voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, any put, call, 
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or 
index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), 
or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities 
exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly 
known as a ‘‘security’’; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary 
or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or 
purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, 
bill of exchange, or banker’s acceptance which has a maturity at the time of 
issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal 
thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.5  
 
The definition of security in the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act is almost the same.6 However, 
the last part of the definition in the 1934 Act, starting with “but shall not include any note,” is 
regulated under section 3 in the 1933 Act.7 Therefore, while the 1933 Act exempts the short-term 
                                                 
4 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
5 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(10) (emphasis added). 
6 Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). 
7 See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) et 
seq.); Securities Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) et 
seq.). 
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notes from being a security, the 1934 Act excludes the short-term notes from the definition.8 
Congress wanted to exclude short-term notes from the securities definition. Otherwise, even a 
personal loan could qualify as a security and would need an exemption from registration.9  
There are two types of instruments that are considered a security. Note, stock, and bond, 
are considered a specific type of security instrument.10 Then, there is “a laundry list of securities” 
in the Acts, such as “evidence of indebtedness,” “participation in any profit-sharing agreement,” 
“investment contract,” and “any instrument commonly known as a security.”11 However, the 
phrase “unless the context otherwise requires” can change the scope of these Acts. Therefore, 
even though the instrument that appears to fall into any of the statutory definitions, the 
instrument may not be held to be a security if the context otherwise requires.12 
Due to the broad statutory definition of the term “security,” there is a vast range of 
uncommon investments that fall to the world of U.S. securities laws. 13   Subsequently, the 
statutory language is extensive, and courts are struggling to provide predictable guidelines.14 
Congress intended to cover several financial instruments, such as stocks and bonds, as well as 
other more hidden arrangements.15 Offerings involving Scotch whiskey,16 cosmetics,17 beavers,18 
                                                 
8 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 56 (2006). 
9 Id. 
10 JOHN C. COFFEE, JOEL SELIGMAN & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 254 
(10th ed. 2007). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION 30 (2016). 
14 Id. 
15 SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2001). 
16 SEC v. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1386, 1389 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). (Scotch whiskey warehouse 
receipts were considered a security. Customers were promised to get profit from the investment.) 
17  SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 1974). (Pyramid promotion enterprise of 
cosmetics were considered a security.). 
18 Cont'l Mktg. Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466, 470 (10th Cir. 1967). (Live beaver brokerage business was considered a 
security. The issuer promised “geometric profits” when the live beaver reproduced.) 
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muskrats,19 animal breeding programs,20 fishing boats,21 coin-operated telephones,22 and orange 
groves,23 have all been considered a security by both the SEC and the courts.24  
Investment contracts are the device that courts use to find out whether the underlying 
agreement is a security. In order to determine what is and what is not an “investment contract,” 
courts apply the Howey Test. 25  
1.3 Judicial Analysis of the Term “Investment Contract” in SEC v. Howey  
The legal meaning of security has been established mainly from the statutory term 
“investment contract.”26 Courts, which must follow Supreme Court precedent, have attempted to 
reach a workable definition.27 Therefore, the courts have formulated various tests and approaches 
to establish the criteria for an investment contract.28  
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp was the first case to deal with the investment contract 
issue. 29  In order to determine whether a security existed, the Court looked to the “terms of the 
offer,” “the plan of distribution,” and the “economic inducements that were held out to the 
prospective prospect.” 30  
                                                 
19  State v. Robbins, 185 Minn. 202, 205 N.W. 456 (1932). (Defendants sold muskrats under profit-sharing 
agreement.). 
20 United States v. Freiberg, 34 F. App’x 281, 282 (2002). (Ostrich breeding venture was considered as a security.). 
21 SEC v. Pyne, 33 F. Supp. 988, 989 (D. Mass. 1940). (Fishing boat shares were considered as a security.). 
22 SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 397 (2004). (Buyers received fixed amount of money depending on being member 
of the program.) 
23 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). (Buyers received profit from their farmlands where the issuer 
managed the whole process.). 
24 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES LITIGATION 38 (7th ed. 2017). 
25 SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2001). 
26 HAZEN, supra note 13. 
27 HAZEN, supra note 13. 
28 HAZEN, supra note 13. 
29 SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 348 (1943). (Defendants were offering exploration as an 
investment.) 
30 Id. at 353; THOMAS LEE HAZEN & DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 18 (2003); 
HAZEN, supra note 13, at 30.  
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However, SEC v. Howey (the Howey case) was one of the most important cases for the 
definition of investment contracts.31 In terms of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, an investment contract 
is “a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise 
and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”32 The 
investment contract classification expresses a flexible principle instead of a static principle.33 
In the Howey case, the company sold farmlands where the company maintained orange 
groves. 34  However, the company also offered management contracts with the sale of these 
farmlands.35 In these management contracts, the company promised to raise, harvest, market, and 
sell the orange groves.36 The Court indicated that offering farmlands with a management contract 
could be a security.37 The Court did not define the term “security,” and instead looked at the 
investment package as a whole.38 Even the way these management contracts were marketed was 
important in the Court’s decision.39 Therefore, how it is being presented is more significant than 
what is being offered.40 
To understand the Howey Test better, we need to analyze the four prongs of the test that 
the court used. While analyzing these prongs, decisions from other courts will be analyzed to 
help us understand how we should interpret the Howey Test. Other courts have further 
interpreted and improved the Howey decision. 
                                                 
31 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
32 Id. at 299. (Interestingly, Canada also adopted a test similar to the Howey Test in their security law. Canadian 
authorities look at four prongs: an investment of money, in a common enterprise, with the expectation of profit, to 
come significantly from the efforts of others. Cryptocurrency Offerings, CANADIAN SECURITIES 
ADMINISTRATORS (CSA Staff Notice 46-307, Aug. 24, 2017), http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_csa_ 
20170824_cryptocurrency-offerings.htm.) 
33 Id. at 299. 
34 Id at 295. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 HAZEN, supra note 13, at 31.  
38 HAZEN, supra note 13, at 31. 
39 HAZEN, supra note 13, at 31. 
40 HAZEN, supra note 13, at 31. 
9 
 
 
1.3.1 An Investment of Money Requirement 
 
The Supreme Court stated that an investor in securities law is a person who invests his or 
her money. According to subsequent case law, the investment of services or property instead of 
money can satisfy this prong.41 
In order to understand precisely what the term “investment of money” means, the SEC 
and the courts ordinarily implement the analysis from Teamsters v. Daniel.42 In this particular 
case, the problem was whether noncontributory, mandatory pension plans generate an investment 
contract according to the meaning of the federal securities law. The trial court applied the Howey 
Test in order to determine whether this pension plan was a security. The trial court found that the 
retirement plan offered by the employer was a security. However, the Supreme Court reversed 
the trial court’s decision since there was no investment of money in this case. The Court said that 
                                                 
41 HAZEN, supra note 13, at 31. 
42 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel 439 U.S. 551, 553 (1979). 
Howey Test 
Managerial 
efforts of others 
Expectation of 
profit 
Common 
enterprise 
Investment of 
money 
©
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the individual who was supposed to be an investor had decided to give up a particular 
consideration in order to get a separable financial interest.43  
In its reasoning, the Court stated that contributions from the employer to these employee 
pension plans were relatively unimportant for the employee’s total compensation package. The 
Court also thought that an employee who participated in this program made no payment to the 
pension fund. The Court further asserted that the worker was not primarily selling labor to make 
an investment. However, the main purpose of the employee’s labor was to earn a salary. 44  
There were other reasons why the Court did not recognize these retirement plans as being 
a security. According to congressional and administrative records, employment pension plans 
were not securities, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 had provided 
individuals in these kinds of plans with the right to challenge decisions. 45  All in all, the 
mandatory, employer-funded retirement plan did not satisfy the criteria of the Howey Test. 
Therefore, there were not any investment contracts or securities.46  
Investing money in return for profit will satisfy this prong.47 Besides that, the investment 
of service or property can also satisfy the investment of money requirement.48 Therefore, while 
deciding whether there is an investment of money, the courts look for the intention of the 
investors. If the investors gave up some considerations in order to receive some financial interest, 
the court may find that there was an investment of money. 
1.3.2 A Common Enterprise Requirement 
 
                                                 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 560. 
45 HAZEN & RATNER, supra note 30, at 32.   
46 HAZEN & RATNER, supra note 30, at 34. 
47 SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2001). 
48 HAZEN, supra note 24, at 41. 
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A common enterprise is another prong for determining the existence of an investment 
contract according to the Howey Test. The common enterprise requirement concentrates on 
whether the success of the investor’s interest rises or falls with other individuals who participate 
in the enterprise. Whether commonality exists is a critical question because the Howey Test will 
not be satisfied without a finding of a common enterprise.49 
According to court decisions, there are two sorts of commonality: horizontal and vertical. 
Courts have different opinions on whether horizontal commonality or vertical commonality 
                                                 
49 HAZEN, supra note 24, at 41-2. 
Commonality 
Horizontal 
Commonality 
Vertical commonality 
Strict Vertical 
Commonality 
Broad Vertical 
Commonality 
©
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satisfies the Howey Test. 
Horizontal commonality focuses on the collection of “every individual investor’s fortune 
to the fortunes of the other investors by the pooling of assets.”50 Pooling of interests among at 
least two investors is the most obvious example of horizontal commonality.51 
Vertical commonality focuses on the connection between the issuer and the investors. 
There are two variances of vertical commonality: broad vertical commonality and strict vertical 
commonality. For broad vertical commonality, the investor’s fortunes rely upon the promoter’s 
efforts and expertise.52 On the contrary, narrow vertical commonality requires that the investor’s 
profits be linked to the manager’s earnings. 53  What this means is that narrow vertical 
commonality requiers investors’ fortunes to be mixed with and reliant upon the success of the 
promoters.54  
Some courts accept horizontal commonality for deciding there is a common enterprise.55 
Some courts hold that a common enterprise can also exist with vertical commonality.56 Some 
courts have decided that broad vertical commonality is able to satisfy the Howey,57 while other 
courts reject broad vertical commonality.58  
1.3.3 An Expectation of Profit Requirement 
                                                 
50 HAZEN & RATNER, supra note 30, at 26. 
51 HAZEN, supra note 24, at 42.  
52 James D. Gordon III, Defining a Common Enterprise in Investment Contracts, 72 OHIO ST. L. J. 59, 61 (2011). 
53 Id. 
54 SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1974).  
55 SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974). 
56 SEC v. Unique Financial Concepts, 196 F.3d 1195, 1199 (11th Cir. 1999) 
57 SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2001). 
58 Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1994). 
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If the investor does not have an expectation of profit, this will prevent a finding of a 
security.59 The profit motive must be at a certain level. 60 If the purchasers’ main purpose is 
utilizing the product rather than making a profit, there would be no expectation of profit.61  
The Supreme Court has recognized an expectation of profit in two circumstances: capital 
gain from the original investment or participation in earnings resulting from the usage of the 
investor’s money.62 
If the promoter promised to share a fixed income stream, this could satisfy the 
expectation of profit requirement.63  According to the Court, there is no difference between fixed 
return and variable return.64 The seller stated that purchasers do not participate in the earnings of 
the enterprise; however, the buyers received a fixed rate of return.65 This did not change the 
overall result. 
1.3.4 Efforts of Others Requirement 
According to the Howey Test, the investors’ return needs to have been anticipated “solely 
from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”66 However, other courts interpreted this rule 
differently and concluded that the profits should be expected from “mainly or considerably from 
the efforts of others.”67  
                                                 
59 HAZEN, supra note 8, at 44.  
60 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). 
61 Id. at 857. 
62 Forman, 421 U.S. at 852. 
63 SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004); HAZEN, supra note 13, at 32. 
64 Edwards, 540 U.S. at 394. 
65 Id. at 389. 
66 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). 
67 SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973). 
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If the efforts of the investor were significant to the success of the enterprise, there would 
be no investment contract.68 This means that the courts do not strictly follow the Howey Test in 
terms of being solely from the efforts of others. Courts consider the word “solely” out of the 
fourth element.69 Actually, this interpretation of the efforts of others is more accurate than the 
Howey Test. The reason behind this idea is that we can protect investors from pyramid schemes. 
In order to avoid the Howey Test, perpetrators make the investor participate in the scheme and, 
in that way, it is no longer solely the efforts of others.   
Though investors needed to put in a little effort to get a return, if the enterprise depends 
on upper management to be successful, there is still an investment contract.70 The SEC and the 
courts try to protect investors through the interpretation of case law.  
In contrast, if the investors have significant power over the enterprise, it would be 
sufficient evidence that there is no managerial effort of others.71  Therefore, even if the investor 
needs to participate somewhat in an operation, like in pyramid sales arrangements, if the effort is 
not crucial for the success of the enterprise, there will be an investment contract.72 
We cannot assume that every effort of the promoter satisfies the managerial efforts of 
others prong. For example, post-investment services that are just ministerial cannot be adequate 
to fulfill this prong.73   
The Howey Test is not the only test courts apply. The Risk Capital Test is the second the 
most important test for many state courts. 
                                                 
68 HAZEN, supra note 13, at 32. 
69 STEPHEN CHOI & ADAM PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION, CASES AND ANALYSIS 135 (2012). 
70 Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d at 483. 
71 SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195 (11 th Cir. 1999). 
72 HAZEN, supra note 13, at 33. 
73 SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 14, 22 (D.D.C. 1995); HAZEN, supra note 13, at 33. 
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1.4 Blue Sky Law and the Risk Capital Test 
Not only federal courts and the SEC but also state courts and organizations are authorized 
to regulate securities law within their region. In the beginning, securities law arose from state 
regulations.74 The first state that applied the “blue sky” law was Kansas.75 In 1911, Kansas 
started to regulate the industrialists to protect the state farmers.76 This is significant because 
Kansas regulated securities law 22 years before the federal government. Kansas was trying to 
stop sale of the “blue sky” to its farmers for a simple fee.77 In this context, “blue sky” is a 
metaphor describing an invaluable investment in exchange for some amount of money. 
Today, all states have their own “blue sky” laws.78 However, this blue sky law varies 
state to state.79 For example, an issuer in New York is not required to register with the New York 
securities administration department, but the state enforces antifraud provisions against the 
issuers.80 On the other hand, California requires an issuer to pass the merit test to sell securities 
in the state.81 
Blue sky law allows states to protect their citizens from securities fraud. For some states, 
the blue sky law allows investors to obtain material information of relevant facts.82 According to 
one commentator, research in blue sky law is always difficult.83 Since the law varies state to state, 
it is highly unlikely that there would be uniformity in its application. 
With the 1996 National Securities Markets Improvement Act, the federal government 
wanted to limit the states’ influence on securities law in terms of state registration 
                                                 
74 HAZEN, supra note 8, at 329. 
75 CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 69, at 575.  
76 HAZEN, supra note 8, at 329. 
77 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATIONS, 14 (7th ed. 2018). 
78 HAZEN, supra note 13, at 15.  
79 CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 69, at 575.  
80 CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 69, at 575. 
81 CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 69, at 575. 
82 HAZEN, supra note 13, at 15. 
83 HAZEN, supra note 8, at 330.  
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requirements.84 However, state laws did not lose their importance in protecting against fraudulent 
transactions.85 
Therefore, we need to look at the other test that states have applied in order to understand 
which instruments are investment contracts. Apart from the dominance of the Howey Test, the 
other test implemented by state courts is the Risk Capital Test.86 
Some state courts have been following Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski decided by 
California Supreme Court, which was the first instance of the so-called Risk Capital Test.87 The 
Supreme Court of Hawaii, Arkansas, District Court of Guam, Court of Appeals of Ohio, 
Supreme Court of Oregon follow this decision.88 Alaska, North Dakota, Georgia, Michigan, 
Washington, Oklahoma have also adopted this Risk Capital Test by statute.89 There are some 
regulatory rules in New Mexico, Wisconsin, Wyoming, North Carolina, and Illinois that follow 
the Risk Capital Test.90 
 The critical part of the Risk Capital Test is that the investors should rely upon others for 
the success of the business 91 and that the promoter uses the activity as an investment tool.92 It is 
very similar to the Howey Test; however, the test has some considerable differences. The Risk 
Capital Test has four key prongs:  
                                                 
84 NATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1996, 1996 Enacted H.R. 3005, 104 Enacted 
H.R. 3005, 110 Stat. 3416 
85 HAZEN, supra note 8, at 306.  
86 Douglas M. Branson & Karl Shumpei Okamoto, The Supreme Court’s Literalism and the Definition of “Security” 
in the State Courts, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043 (June 1, 1993), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/ 
vol50/iss3/5. 
87 Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal.2d 811 (1961).  
88 The Risk Capital Test - List of States, SUSTAINABLE ECONS. LAW CTR., https://www.theselc.org/which_states_ 
apply_the_risk_capital_test_when_deciding_what_is_a_security (last visited Oct. 29, 2018). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. Washington’s statutory defines a security as follows: “investment of money or other consideration in the risk 
capital of a venture with the expectation of some valuable benefit to the investor where the investor does not receive 
the right to exercise practical and actual control over the managerial decisions of the venture.” WASH. REV. CODE § 
21.20.005(12). 
91 HAZEN, supra note 24, at 45. 
92 HAZEN, supra note 24, at 45. 
17 
 
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and (2) a portion of this initial 
value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise, and (3) the furnishing of the initial 
value is induced by the offeror's promises or representations which give rise to a 
reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the  
initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of  the  
enterprise, and (4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and 
actual control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.93  
 
  
For the Risk Capital Test, it is crucial to see whether funds have been raised to develop 
an enterprise. Additionally, it is important to see if the promoter presented the transaction to the 
public as a whole. Aside from that, whether or not the investors are relatively powerless to affect 
the success of the enterprise is also taken into account. The primary problem is whether the 
investor’s fund is substantially at risk since it is insufficiently secured.94 
In Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, the court ruled that the petitioners had solicited 
risk capital to develop a business for profit.95 Even if investors do not receive any material 
benefit, the court held that the securities act still protects those investors.96  
The court in the Sobieski case held that the sale of membership to a country club is a 
security.97 In this case, the court made an effort to preserve the public from the financial risks 
                                                 
93 State v. Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 52 Haw 642, 649 
94 The Risk Capital Test - List of States, supra note 88. 
95 Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal.2d 811, 815 (1961). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
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that the promoters could possibly cause.98 The investors risked the capital hoping to receive 
some benefits from the country club. In this case, the court stated that the securities act applies 
even if the investor does not expect to have any material benefits.99 In the Howey Test, an 
expectation of profit is substantial in order to determine whether the investment can be 
considered a security. 
For the Risk Capital Test “what investors stand to lose” is more important than “what the 
investors expect to gain.”100 Also, the Court held that the Risk Capital Test has a significant 
advantage when contrasted with the Howey Test. The definition of a benefit is not as narrow as it 
is in the Howey Test since a benefit does not have to be material.101 
Another court found that the offer to pay interest on an investment would be a security 
according to Risk Capital Test. However, if the investors’ capital was not at risk because the 
offeror secured the investment with valuable materials, such as a diamond that was worth at least 
$500, then there is no risk capital since the customers were properly secured.102 
Thus, there are some differences between the Risk Capital Test and the Howey Test. The 
Risk Capital Test is more flexible compared to the Howey Test. An investor does not have to 
prove that there is a common enterprise. Also, under the Howey Test, the anticipated return must 
be substantial. Nevertheless, the Risk Capital Test does not concentrate on substantial benefit. 
For instance, interest in a golf club satisfied the Risk Capital Test in California. On the other 
hand, since there was no expectation of profit, it would not be a security according to the Howey 
Test.103 
                                                 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Wolf v. Banco Nacional De Mexico, 549 F. Supp. 841, 852 (N.D. Cal. 1982). 
101 SEC v. Coll. Assistance Plan, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 118, 122 (D. Guam 1981). 
102 Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of Corps., 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 336 (1974). 
103 HAZEN, supra note 24, at 46.  
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Generally, state courts that follow the Risk Capital Test apply both the Howey Test and 
the Risk Capital Test. Therefore, if the instrument fulfills the definition of a security under one of 
the tests, courts hold that an instrument is a security. State courts that do not follow the Risk 
Capital Test follow the Howey Test in order to decide whether an instrument is a security.104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
104 The Risk Capital Test - List of States, supra note 88. 
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CHAPTER 2: ANALYSIS OF ICOS ACCORDING TO U.S. SECURITIES LAW 
This chapter will analyze Initial Coin Offerings (ICO) in terms of the Howey and Risk 
Capital Tests. If the tokens pass these tests, it is likely that they will be considered securities, 
whether in a federal court or a state court. The issuers should look at these regulations when 
issuing tokens; if they are likely to pass these tests, the issuers should consider the solutions I 
discuss in the last section.105 
First, I will analyze what an ICO is. While explaining what an ICO is, I will discuss the 
differences and similarities between ICOs and Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). Then, I will 
describe the differences between payment, utility, and security tokens. There are no certain 
borders between these tokens, though. One token can be a utility token in the beginning, and then 
later become a payment token. Applicable law will be different according to the type of token 
involved.  
Federal courts and many state courts follow the Howey Test to decide whether there is an 
investment contract and, therefore, a security.106 If there is a security, these courts will apply 
securities law to these transactions. On the other hand, as we mentioned in the first chapter, some 
state courts apply the Risk Capital Test to determine whether the scheme is a security.107 This 
analysis will review the Howey Test more than the Risk Capital Test since the application of the 
Risk Capital Test is geographically limited.108 
2.1 What is an ICO? 
                                                 
105 Infra Chapter 4. 
106 Supra 1.3 Judicial Interpretation of the Howey Test.  
107 Supra 1.4 the Risk Capital Test. 
108 Supra 1.4 the Risk Capital Test. 
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The ICO is a concept that describes a means of a new fundraising event. In the ICO 
process, companies or individuals sell their tokens to the public. This part of the token sale only 
focuses on the transaction from the issuer to the first buyer. This means that the ICO does not 
focus on secondary market activities. 
 Tokens give some individual rights to their owners in exchange for fiat money like the 
U.S. dollar, Chinese Yuan, European Euro or payment tokens like Bitcoin or Ethereum.109 These 
rights will determine the types of tokens the issuer sells. Typically, companies explain in their 
white paper how the system works, what kind of rights the buyer will receive, and how 
purchasers will receive a return from the process.110  
While reducing transaction cost, ICOs offer unique liquidity and efficiency for companies 
as well as individuals.111 Beginning from Mastercoin in 2013, there are many ICOs held by 
people.112 Until now, companies were able to raise millions of dollars in a short period of time. 
2.2 Similarities and Differences between an ICO and an IPO 
The name of the ICO (initial coin offering) is very similar to IPO (initial public offering). 
Therefore, ICOs are generally compared to IPOs, which is the process that companies use to sell 
their shares to the public for the first time.113 
                                                 
109 Infra 2.3.1 Payment Tokens. 
110 See Christoph Jentzsch, Decentralized Autonomous Organization to Automate Governance, WHITE PAPER (Nov. 
2016), https://download.slock.it/public/DAO/WhitePaper.pdf. 
111 Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Coin Offerings: The Top 25 Jurisdictions and Their Comparative Regulatory Responses 2 
(Univ. of St. Thomas (Minn.) Legal Studies Research Paper No. 18-07, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3117224.  
112 Alexis Collomb, Primavera De Filippi & Klara Sok, From IPOs to ICOs: The Impact of Blockchain Technology 
on Financial Regulation 1 (Blockchain Perspectives Joint Research Initiative, June 11, 2018), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3185347. 
113 Erin Griffith, Why Startups are Trading IPOs for ICOs, FORTUNE (May 5, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/05/05/ 
ico-initial-coin-offering/. 
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The main similarity between an ICO and an IPO is that they are both a fund-raising 
mechanism for companies. When companies and people are in need of funds, one way to raise 
money is issuing stocks and selling them to the public. Also, with token sales, the companies 
receive the capital from the market. 
There are many differences between ICOs and IPOs. The first difference is that, while 
companies in their early stages use ICOs, well-settled companies use IPOs. 114  The other 
difference between ICOs and IPOs is that, while IPOs are undoubtedly subject to the 1933 Act 
and the 1934 Act, ICOs may or may not be subject to these Acts. 115 In the U.S., the IPO 
procedure is such an extended process that it involves hiring investment banking and securities 
law attorneys.116 On the other hand, individuals can create tokens through a blockchain system, 
explain how it works to the public, and start fundraising events without these intermediaries. 
While the ICO process is shorter and cheaper, the investors are less secure compared to the IPO 
process. 
Furthermore, in an IPO, businesses sell their ownership rights to the public; on the other 
hand, most ICOs do not give equity or ownership interests to the buyers.117 While shareholders 
have rights in a company’s bankruptcy, token holders generally do not have a claim to the 
company’s assets since there are no ownership rights on the company. 
 
 
                                                 
114 Collomb, De Filippi & Sok, supra note 112, at 5. 
115 Randolph Robinson, The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion of Initial Coin Offerings, 26 TENN. L. 
REV. (forthcoming, Dec. 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3087541. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 27. 
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2.3 Categorization of Tokens 
This section will examine three different kinds of tokens: payment tokens, security tokens, 
and utility tokens. The differences among these tokens are significant because, based on the 
status of token, the applicable law can be changed. As an example, while payment tokens are 
considered a commodity, security tokens are considered a security. Utility tokens are found 
somewhere in the middle. The Securities and Exchange Office and Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission always watch the activities in these markets. 
Tokens can be used in a broader range than cryptocurrencies. 118  Cryptocurrencies 
represent inherent value; however, they do not include legal tender status.119 This thesis analyzes 
cryptocurrencies under payment tokens. In contrast to payment tokens, a utility token can give 
some access rights to its holders. 120  Also, security tokens give their owner some particular 
ownership rights, such as getting dividends or voting about the company’s decisions.121 
According to one study, the tokens are used for 44% as a payment token, 35% a utility 
token, 14% as an investment token.122 According to another survey that includes all initial coin 
offerings between 2013 to 2017, approximately 75% of all tokens were used to access to a 
                                                 
118 Iyke Aru, Tokenization: The Force Behind Blockchain Technology, COINTELEGRAPH (Sep. 29, 2017), https:// 
cointelegraph.com/news/tokenization-the-force-behind-blockchain-technology. 
119 Jay Clayton, Chairman's Testimony on Virtual Currencies: The Roles of the SEC and CFTC, U.S. SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testimony-virtual-currencies-
oversight-role-us-securities-and-exchange-commission; Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Regulating 
Cryptocurrencies in the United States: Current Issues and Future Directions, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 813, 828 
(2014) http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss2/11. 
120 Infra 2.3.2 Utility Tokens.  
121 Infra 2.3.3 Security Tokens. 
122 Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Douglas W. Arner & Linus Föhr, The ICO Gold Rush: It's a Scam, It's a 
Bubble, It's a Super Challenge for Regulators 8 (Univ. of Lux. Law Working Paper No. 11/2017; Univ. of New S. 
Wales Law Research Paper No. 17-83; Univ. of H.K. Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2017/035; European 
Banking Institute Working Paper Series 18/2018; Harvard Int’l Law Journal, Vol. 63, No. 2, 2019, 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3072298. 
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service, 50% were used as payment, 25% were granted for investment and some other reasons.123 
These differences arise most likely from different understandings of categorizations.124 
Therefore, this thesis will analyze three types of tokens in terms of securities law. Even if 
the general category gives some ideas, every individual token should be examined in order to 
reach a solid conclusion.125 
 
2.3.1 Payment Tokens 
Payment tokens, in other words cryptocurrencies, have inherent value like gold or cash 
that are designated to enable sales, purchases, and other transactions. Many of the payment 
tokens are promoted as providing the same functions as the U.S. dollar, Turkish Lira, Chinese 
Yuan, etc. but without being backed by a government or other financial institution. 126 
                                                 
123 Token Rights: Key Considerations in Crypto-Economic Design, SMITH+CROWN (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://www.smithandcrown.com/token-rights. See also Philipp Maume & Mathias Fromberger, Regulation of Initial 
Coin Offerings: Reconciling US and EU Securities Laws, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming July 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3200037. 
124 Maume & Fromberger, supra note 123.  
125 Infra Chapter 3. 
126 Clayton, supra note 119. 
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Cryptocurrencies are marketed for different reasons. People generally try to get 
cryptocurrency to transfer their money without an intermediary, such as a bank. Also, in the 
cryptocurrency system, there are no geographic limitations, and the cost of transactions is lower 
than the banking system.   
Generally, U.S.-based cryptocurrency trading platforms are regulated as money 
transmission services. These money transmission systems have not been subject to direct 
overview by the SEC or the CFTC. 127  The Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) regulates the money transmission systems.128 
In general, the SEC only regulates securities transactions and the companies who 
participate in the securities market. The SEC does not have the right to control the transactions in 
currencies and commodities and money trading platforms.129 
It is not essential to the SEC if a company chooses to refer to its tokens as a 
cryptocurrency. The SEC always looks for what the real thing is under that name. Simply calling 
something a currency or a currency-based product does not mean it is not a security and is not 
going to be subject to SEC regulations.130  
Bitcoin is one example of a payment token. According to CFTC, Bitcoin is a commodity. 
131 Also, according to Jay Clayton, the president of the SEC, Bitcoin is not a security but a 
                                                 
127 Clayton, supra note 119. 
128 Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies, DEP’T 
OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK GUIDANCE (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/ 
default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf. 
129 Clayton, supra note 119. 
130 Clayton, supra note 119. 
131 Federal Court Finds that Virtual Currencies Are Commodities, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 
COMMISSION (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7820-18. 
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medium of exchange.132 In another case, the Court found that Bitcoin was a medium of exchange, 
a store of value, and a means of payment.133 If a token has similar characteristics to Bitcoin, it 
will most likely be treated as a commodity. 
2.3.2 Utility Tokens 
Utility tokens, which can be called app coins or app tokens, offer users access to 
merchandise or services. 134 There are two types of utility tokens issuers sell to the people: pre-
functional and fully-functional. 
People can find out whether a token is pre-functional or fully-functional from the 
company’s white papers. If the white paper indicates that the issuer will develop the system after 
the fund-raising event, then the token is most likely a pre-functional security token. On the other 
hand, if the issuer has already built the system, then the token is most likely a fully-functional 
utility token. 
 
                                                 
132 Kate Rooney, SEC Chief Says Agency Won't Change Securities Laws to Cater to Cryptocurrencies, CNBC (June 
6, 2018, 10:45 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/06/sec-chairman-clayton-says-agency-wont-change-definition-
of-a-security.html (last updated June 11, 2018, 9:35 AM).  
133 SEC v. Trendon T. Shavers & Bitcoin Sav. & Tr., No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194382, at *17 (E.D. 
Tex. Aug. 26, 2014). 
134 Josiah Wilmoth, 3 Types of ICO Tokens, STRATEGIC COIN (Oct. 5, 2017), https://strategiccoin.com/3-types-ico-
tokens/. 
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Issuers of tokens sometimes prepare Initial Coin Offerings for utility tokens. For example, 
Filecoin was a pre-functional utility token. It raised $257 million to provide a decentralized 
cloud storage service.135 ICO funders received tokens that they could use to purchase storage 
space from Filecoin once the company had launched the service.136 Also, the Munchee token can 
be considered under this section. The Munchee token was used as a form of payment in 
restaurants to incentivize food reviews. It also allowed its holders to trade in secondary 
trading.137 This means that the Munchee token was not only a payment token but also a utility 
token and a security token at the same time.138 
While pre-functional utility tokens are most likely an investment contract, fully-
functional utility tokens are not. For the fully-functional utility tokens, there would be no 
expectation of profit from the efforts of others.139 If the instrument has consumptive value, like 
fully-functional utility tokens, it would not be a security since there is no expectation of profit 
                                                 
135 Stan Higgins, $257 Million: Filecoin Breaks All-Time Record for ICO Funding, COINDESK (Sept. 7, 2017, 20:45), 
https://www.coindesk.com/257-million-filecoin-breaks-time-record-ico-funding (last updated Sept. 8, 2017, 15:00). 
136 Wilmoth, supra note 134. 
137 Infra 3.2 MUN Token. 
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from the efforts of others.140 On the other hand, pre-functional utility tokens are most likely an 
investment contract since the holders do not have the right to consume. They need to wait until 
the issuer develops the system.  
2.3.3 Security Tokens 
Security tokens are equivalent to traditional securities; however, issuers created them on 
decentralized or centralized ledger systems. From time to time, these tokens offer cash flow or 
voting rights. Sometimes they are just labeled as security tokens.141 
Issuers of security tokens who hope to raise money to develop a business generally sell 
tokens rather than sell shares, issue notes, or obtain bank support.142 Investors invest their money 
with the expectation of profit supported by the issuer’s effort. 
Even if the token itself is not a security, like the citrus groves in the Howey Test, the 
same asset can be offered in a way that causes investors to have a reasonable expectation of 
profit based on the efforts of others. For example, Bitcoin itself is not a security according to 
William Hinman, the Director of Division of Corporation Finance.143 However, in Shavers, the 
court concluded that the scheme involving Bitcoin was an investment contract and, therefore, 
was a security contract.144 DAO tokens can be considered under these tokens.145 
2.4 Howey Test for ICOs 
                                                 
140 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 853 (1975). 
141 Jiasun Li & William Mann, Initial Coin Offerings and Platform Building 2 (2018 WFA, 2019 AFA, 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3088726.  
142 William Hinman, Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic), U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION (June 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418.  
143 Id. 
144 SEC v. Trendon T. Shavers & Bitcoin Sav. & Tr., No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194382, at *16 (E.D. 
Tex. Aug. 26, 2014). 
145 See the discussion in DAO. 
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2.4.1 Whether or Not ICOs Satisfy the Investment of Money Prong? 
Issuers sell a number of tokens for cash.146 In terms of the Howey Test, these ICOs 
definitely satisfy the investment of money prong.147 The reason is that these ICOs include the 
same type of investment with the Howey Test.148 On the other hand, some ICOs include sales of 
tokens for other payment tokens.149 These token sales also satisfy the investment of money prong 
since in the Shavers case, even though the defendant claimed that Bitcoin cannot represent an 
investment of money, the court ruled that the investment of money prong can be satisfied even 
when there is no legal tender status.150 
Sale of tokens is not the only way the token holder receives tokens. Issuers can offer 
tokens for participation in the token ecosystem.151 The best example of this would be the Filecoin 
tokens. Filecoin completed its ICO in 2017; however, the issuer offered tokens to the individuals 
who provided storage to the Filecoin system.152 As I discussed in the first chapter, according to 
case law, investment of services can also satisfy the investment of money prong.153 Since the 
investors chose to give up usage of their computers as an investment of service in Filecoin, it is 
highly likely that the court would find that the mining service satisfied the investment of money 
prong.154 
                                                 
146 Juan Batiz-Benet, Jesse Clayburgh & Marco Santori, The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant Token Sale Framework, 
COOLEY LLP at 7 (2017), https://saftproject.com/static/SAFT-Project-Whitepaper.pdf. 
147 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). 
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150 SEC v. Trendon T. Shavers & Bitcoin Sav. & Tr., No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194382 at *15 (E.D. 
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151 JAY B. SYKES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45301, SECURITIES REGULATION AND INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS: A 
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On the other hand, not every investment of service satisfies the investment of money 
prong. Courts generally look at the whole picture to decide whether the activity fulfills this prong. 
As we remember from Teamsters v. Daniel, the plaintiff’s investment of service was not 
considered as investment of money. 155  However, this case can be easily distinguished from 
Filecoin since the participants tried to get a reward in exchange for service. In Teamsters v. 
Daniel, the main purpose for the employee was earning a salary rather than interest in the 
pension plan. Therefore, the pension plan was not considered an investment contract. 156 
Investment of service in ICOs most likely satisfies the investment of money prong. 
2.4.2. Whether or not ICOs Satisfy Common Enterprise Prong?  
Specific features of ICOs are used to determine whether there is a common enterprise. As 
I discussed in the first chapter, there are three types of commonality tests that courts use to define 
a common enterprise in investment contracts:157 horizontal, broad vertical, and strict vertical.158 
When the issuers of tokens pool the money from their investors to develop a network, 
horizontal commonality can be found easily.159 Utility tokens can be evaluated under horizontal 
commonality since the issuer pools the investors’ money to develop an application.160 
When the value of tokens issued for the ICOs relies on the expertise of the issuer, such as 
developing an application, the initial coin offering may involve broad vertical commonality.161 
Many tokens satisfy the broad vertical commonality test since the investors generally depend on 
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the expertise of the issuers. For example, the investors of Filecoin depended on the expertise of 
the Filecoin managers to develop the decentralized data storage system.162  
On the other hand, if the value of tokens depends on the issuer’s profits, dividends, or 
other kinds of returns, there would be a narrow vertical commonality.163 In this context, if the 
promoter is successful, the investor will receive the profits. However, these kinds of tokens are 
rare.164 
2.4.3 Whether or Not ICOs Satisfy the Expectation of Profit Prong? 
The specific features of tokens should be evaluated according to the expectation of profit 
prong. Primary objectives of buyers will determine the results. Of course, when deciding the 
primary reason for the token holders, we should also look at the whitepaper to see what the issuer 
promised. Especially in terms of utility tokens, this prong is very important. 
It is necessary for us to evaluate whether the buyers get the tokens to use, to consume, or 
to invest.165  If the token holders have an expectation of the increased value of initial investment 
or participation in the profit sharing, this Howey prong can be satisfied.166 For instance, the 
Munchee company explained in its white paper that the buyers should expect to receive a profit 
from holding the tokens.167 
What kind of benefits the token holders will receive is significant when deciding whether 
the token holders reasonably expected profits.168 If the issuers claim the token will gain value or 
the holders will receive financial benefits from holding the token, then the token satisfies the 
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expectation of profit prong of the Howey Test. On the other hand, if the benefits are based on 
goods or services to exchange, the token cannot be considered a security since the primary 
expectation is not gaining a profit.169  
Some commentators argue that utility tokens may be produced or bought for two 
purposes.170 First, the token holders can use the token to receive goods or services.171 This part is 
unrelated with the field of the securities law. Second, the holders have an expectation of profit 
from buying and selling the token. 172   This expectation can create an investment contract; 
therefore, there is a security. The main function of the token will determine the result.173 If the 
purchaser’s primary purpose is just using the token for the services the issuer provides, the 
expectation of profit prong will not be satisfied. On the other hand, if the seller says or implies 
that the token holder may receive profits from holding the tokens, courts may find that the issuer 
created an expectation of profit, even if the token could only be used for buying goods or 
services.174   
2.4.4. Whether or Not ICOs Satisfy Managerial Efforts of Others Prong? 
Control powers of buyers over the tokens and the token venture is important in the 
evaluation of ICOs.175 The degree of control will determine whether they relied primarily on the 
managerial controls of others. To figure out what degree of control the buyers have, we need to 
look the rights, obligations, and powers the token provides.176  
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If the token holders have plenty of rights and powers to manage the token venture, an 
initial coin offering is unlikely to depend on the managerial efforts of others.177 On the other 
hand, if the token holders have restricted rights on the venture, the token holders most likely rely 
on the managerial efforts of others.178 Therefore, it is critical to look at the white paper of the 
initial coin offerings to see who is going to be responsible for making the profit.  
Pre-purchase and post-purchase efforts would be another thing we need to focus on while 
we are looking at the managerial efforts of others prong.179 If the token issuer performed the 
managerial efforts after the token sale, there would most likely be an investment contract.180 
However, if the post-purchase efforts were ministerial or clerical rather than managerial, there 
would not be an investment contract.181 
2.5 Risk Capital Test for ICOs 
The Risk Capital Test is one of the tests that some states apply to determine whether 
instruments, schemes, or transactions are securities.182 Since the Risk Capital Test application is 
limited geographically, scholars have analyzed this test less than they have the Howey Test. 
However, it is essential for the issuer of the tokens to know whether the token is a security or not. 
According to this result, the issuer may or may not need to register the tokens at the state level as 
well.  
There is a possibility for the issuer that the token is not a security under federal law, but it 
is a security under state law. As I discussed in the first chapter, while the Howey Test is looking 
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for commonality and expectation of essential profit, the Risk Capital Test looks for some profit 
from the instrument and is not interested in the commonality.183 
While we are considering whether the token is a security under the Risk Capital Test, we 
need to focus on four prongs:184 1) whether the token buyers give an initial value to the token 
issuer, 2) whether this initial value is subject to the risk of the token venture, 3) whether the 
token holder expects some valuable benefits, and 4) the token holder does not have the right to 
control the venture.185 If these four prongs are satisfied, then the token should be registered in 
states that use the Risk Capital Test to determine whether the instrument is a security.186 
In terms of payment tokens, there is no difference between fully-functional utility tokens 
and security tokens under the Howey Test and the Risk Capital Test. Payment tokens and fully-
functional utility tokens have consumptive value; therefore, they are not securities under either 
test. Security tokens satisfy both the Howey and Risk Capital Tests.  
 However, in terms of pre-functional utility tokens, the Risk Capital Test can provide a 
more solid solution than the Howey Test can. Generally, for pre-functional utility tokens, issuers 
raise capital to develop the application. The buyer can then put her money at risk with this 
investment. Therefore, in terms of the Risk Capital Test, there would be no confusion whether 
this is an investment contract.187  
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The general assumption is that, if the token satisfies the Howey Test, it will most likely 
fulfill the Risk Capital Test.188 The Risk Capital Test tries to protect investors more than the 
Howey Test while reducing the level of expectation of profit and commonality. Therefore, token 
issuers should exercise caution when offering their tokens in states that apply the Risk Capital 
Test.189 
There have been some recent decisions made by the North Dakota securities office 
regarding ICOs.190 As Chapter 1 explained, states have the right to protect their citizens from 
fraudulent schemes.191 In order to protect North Dakota’s citizens, the securities office created an 
ICO Task Force department.192 Since this department protects citizens from securities fraud, it 
must be analyzed under blue sky laws.  
As we know, North Dakota is one of the states that applies the Risk Capital Test to 
determine whether an instrument is a security. 193  The North Dakota Securities Commission 
implemented securities law to several ICOs. One example is Magma Coin. 194 The company 
fraudulently alleged that the coin was backed by Gold and ETFs.195 The names of the executive 
team members were also fake.196 North Dakota’s ICO Task Force explained that whitepapers 
generally represent the “idea.” As far as we discussed in the Risk Capital Test section, tokens 
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that involve only ideas would be considered securities.  Therefore, they would need to be 
registered before they can be sold in North Dakota. 
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CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL TOKENS: THE GRAY AREA 
So far, this thesis has analyzed the Howey Test, the Risk Capital Test, ICOs, and 
different types of tokens. However, while deciding whether individual tokens are securities, 
lawyers should look at the token closely. There are small differences that can change the overall 
result. The SEC and the courts do not focus on every prong from the Howey and the Risk Capital 
Tests while determining whether a specific token is a security. The SEC and the courts should 
have made a more detailed decision to clarify whether the old law fits into the new token system. 
This part of the thesis will analyze the XRP token, the Munchee Token, the Storj Token, 
and the DAO token. There are several discussions we can make on these tokens to clarify some 
parts of the Howey and Risk Capital Tests. The reason I chose these tokens is that they are the 
leaders of their fields. 
3.1 Whether XRP Token Is a Security under California Law and the Federal Law? 
Ripple created XRP to solve the problem of Denial of Service Attacks.197 Denial of 
Service Attacks occurs when someone maliciously creates many identities in a distributed ledger 
system to exercise considerable influence on the ledger system.198 If there are enough requests 
from the attackers, consensus process substantially disrupts the settlement process.199 XRP, like 
Bitcoin, is a math-based cryptocurrency.200 The difference between XRP and Bitcoin is that, 
while the publicly distributed ledger system controls Bitcoin, Ripple ledger system approves 
transactions for the XRP tokens.201 
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To determine whether XRP is a security or commodity, professionals need to analyze 
whether there is an investment contract. XRP is a very questionable token that there is a class 
action lawsuit in California.202 California state applies Risk Capital Test; on the other hand, the 
federal courts apply the Howey Test.203 
Buyers of the XRP tokens sued Ripple, XRP II and the CEO of the Company. The 
plaintiffs alleged that Ripple, XRP II, and the CEO indorsed, sold and solicited the sale of XRP 
and raised millions of dollars. Plaintiffs are claiming that XRP is unregistered security tokens 
and there is no valid exemption for not being registered.204 
According to SEC, securities cannot be sold without registration if there is no valid 
exemption from the registration. Also, Jay Clinton Chairman of the SEC stated that changing the 
traditional corporate interest which is recorded in a central ledger to blockchain entry on 
distributed ledger may not change the substance.205 Therefore, we should apply the Howey Test 
and Risk Capital Test to these tokens. 
Investment of Money: Plaintiffs analyzed the XRP tokens regarding the Howey Test and 
the Risk Capital Test. People can purchase the XRP tokens with U.S. dollars, Euro or other 
cryptocurrencies.206 As we know from the Shavers case, investment of Bitcoin is also considered 
as an investment of money.207 Therefore, we can conclude that the plaintiffs satisfied the first 
prong of the Howey Test which is an investment of money. 
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Plaintiffs state that XRP token is not only as a means of exchange but also investment 
contract.208 In this respect, plaintiffs claim that XRP token is not only a payment token but also 
an investment token. If XRP is only payment token, it is a commodity.209 On the other hand, if it 
covers investment token, it cannot be considered just as a commodity.  
The expectation of profits: according to plaintiffs Ripple does hold not only the tokens 
but also improves the XRP network. Ripple changed many functions of the XRP token such as 
decreasing transaction time, improving system security and compatibility.210 Ripple also released 
a white paper regarding return on investments. 211 Ripple is making statements about the return 
of investments about XRP tokens. Therefore, Ripple’s statement creates an expectation of profit 
for the buyers. 
Managerial Efforts of Others: Plaintiffs main argument in their complaint letter that 
Ripple manages, controls, and improves the XRP token. They distinguished the XRP token from 
the Bitcoin and Ethereum. They stated that Ripple created the XRP token and gave 20% to the 
founders of Ripple and 80% held in the company. The Ripple company sells this 80 % in order 
to raise fund and improve the company operations. In this respect, XRP tokens are centralized if 
we compare with the Bitcoin and Ethereum. 212  
Plaintiffs provided several statements from the Ripple announcements. These statements 
indicate that Ripple has authority on the XRP. For example, Ripple announced that Ripple put 
$55B in an escrow account and the managers of XRP tweeted this as a big success of the XRP.213 
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Plaintiffs also claimed that Ripple markets the XRP token, drive demand and tries to 
increase the price of XRP. Ripple shows in his website that how people can buy the XRP 
tokens.214 Ripple mentioned in its website that the Ripple company committed to the health and 
stability for the XRP in the long run.215  
According to plaintiffs, the Ripple Company’s primary source of income is coming from 
the sale of XRP to the investors. Therefore, the price of the XRP token directly tied to the 
managerial skills and efforts of Ripple.216 Also, Ripple stated that Ripple would accelerate the 
speed of XRP ledger to build on speed, uptime, and scalability.217 Ripple announced that the 
company would ensure XRP is the most trusted digital currency.218 All these factors show that 
Ripple is the only authority in the management of XRP tokens.  
In a Common Enterprise: plaintiffs just mentioned the common enterprise prong in their 
complain letter.219 They did not make detailed analysis for this prong. The reason behind this 
would be that the courts and governmental organizations can easily find out horizontal 
commonality in ICOs.220 Ripple sold the XRP tokens and pooled the money to improve the 
system; therefore, there is a horizontal commonality. 
Risk Capital Test: Plaintiffs sued the Ripple company in California. Therefore, the court 
will also analyze the Risk Capital Test. Plaintiffs argued that Ripple uses the XRP funds to 
operate its business, the Ripple Company offers XRP tokens for sale to the public at large, 
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plaintiffs do not have the power to control the success of Ripple, and plaintiffs’ investment is 
substantially at risk.221 
In this case, plaintiffs made a wise movement that they sue the Ripple Company in 
California. As we discussed in the second chapter, the Risk Capital Test is more protective than 
the Howey Test. 222  Since Risk Capital Test does not focus on common enterprise and 
expectation of essential profit prongs, the declaration of security token is more straightforward. 
On the other hand, the defendants are trying to move the case from State Court to the Federal 
Court.223 I think that the main reason behind this request is that the defendants do not want to be 
subject to Risk Capital Test since it is more protective than the Howey Test.  
3.2 Whether MUN Token, Which Is Pre-functional Utility Token Promising Profit, Can Be 
Considered a Security? 
MUN token is very significant since it is one of the representatives of pre-functional 
utility tokens. For pre-functional utility tokens, issuers generally raise fund in order to develop 
the application. Even if the token had some functions, the company raised the capital for further 
developments. Also, the company created faith to make a profit for the people. 
Munchee Incorporation (Munchee) created MUN token and sold in October and 
November 2017.224 The SEC commenced an administrative proceeding for Munchee. Munchee 
submitted an Offer of Settlement to the SEC.225 SEC accepted this settlement.226 
Munchee is a privately-owned Delaware company based in California created an iPhone 
app for restaurant reviews. Munchee Inc wanted to recruit users to write evaluations, sell food 
                                                 
221 Complain Letter, Case 3:18-cv-06753-WHA at 23, (11/07/18) 
222 Supra 1.4 Blue Sky Law and the Risk Capital Test. 
223 De, supra note 202.  
224 In the Matter of Munchee, Inc., SEC Release No. 10445 (Dec. 11,2017) (“The Munchee Order”) 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10445.pdf at 1. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
42 
 
and conduct some other transactions using MUN tokens. 227 Munchee stated in their white paper 
that MUN tokens would be more valuable because of Munchee’s efforts.228  
Munchee started developing the Munchee Application in late 2015. They launched the 
application in 2017. In October 2017, Munchee announced Munchee would launch an initial coin 
offering for the sale of MUN tokens. Munchee in its white paper explained how the company 
will use the raised funds, how people will get a return from this investment. Munchee created 
500 million MUN tokens and planned to sell 225 million in the initial coin offering process.229 
The rest of the MUN tokens held by the company to improve the company’s business, hire new 
people, pay the employees, and facilitate future advertisement.230 Munchee offered MUN tokens 
to build a profitable enterprise for the MUN holders.231 
Even if Munchee told that holders of MUN tokens could buy goods and services through 
its website, no one could purchase these goods and services in this period. 232 This was because 
the system was not fully completed. 
Munchee explained how MUN tokens gain value with the Munchee ecosystem. After the 
initial coin offering of MUN token, Munchee may burn some Munchee tokens which are held by 
the company. Also, the company said the advertisement rate in Munchee’s website would 
increase since many restaurants will want to be advertised. 233 
We need to discuss the prongs from the Howey Test in order to understand whether the 
Munchee tokens are the securities. 
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Investment of money: Munchee created 500 million MUN tokens in Ethereum 
blockchain and declared that Munchee would not create an additional token.234 Munchee sold 
MUN tokens to raise around $15 million that Munchee Inc could improve its existing app.235 
Investors paid Bitcoin or Ether to buy the MUN tokens.236 According to the Shavers case, it is 
enough for the satisfying investment of Money.237 
The Expectation of Profit: in the advertisements of MUN ICO, Munchee made several 
public statements that if the people are early enough, they will likely get a return on it. Munchee 
offered to give MUN tokens the people who advertise the tokens in social platforms such as 
BitcoinTalk.org.238 Even if Munchee did not offer any dividend or other periodic payment, the 
company created an expectation for the token will be more valuable.239 Also, Munchee promised 
to provide a secondary trading market for the MUN tokens.240 
Efforts of the Munchee Inc: Buyers of Munchee tokens would have the expectation of 
profit from the Munchee’s effort. Munchee’s whitepaper indicated that the founders of the 
company worked at prominent technology companies and they have excellent skills for running a 
business and creating software.241 Investors of MUN tokens had little effect on the price of 
tokens.242 Therefore, they relied on Munchee’s expertise.  
SEC just mentioned in the order that MUN tokens had a practical use at the time of 
offering. However, it did not stop SEC from concluding that MUN tokens are not securities but 
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utility tokens.243 SEC should have analyzed this prong to make it clear for the other token issuers. 
If the token had full functions in the beginning, developing the system cannot make the token as 
a security. If the MUN tokens’ holders purchased a commodity for personal consumption, SEC 
or the courts could not consider it as a security.244  
In this matter, after the SEC official contacted with Munchee, the company stopped the 
sale of the tokens and consented the SEC order. Also, the company returned the money the 
people who had already bought the MUN tokens. Therefore, the SEC did not impose a civil 
penalty to the Munchee245 This matter shows us that token sales involving potential profits most 
likely qualify as securities.246  
3.3. Whether Pre-Functional Non-Profit Promising Storj Token Can Be Considered a 
Security? 
This token is one of the unique tokens since there is no action taken by the SEC and the 
courts against the Storj token. The Storj Company promises to store files for its token holders in 
early 2019.247 The company’s purpose is facilitating and maintaining data storages through the 
decentralized system. 248  Storj token holders can use the tokens for interaction with Storj 
network.249  
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Storj blockchain system motivates the token holders to give an opportunity to participate 
in the system with these tokens.250 The Storj ecosystem offers two functions. The token holders 
buy these decentralized storages or sell their unused storages to the system. 251 If the token holder 
buys the storage from the Storj, he or she needs to pay with the Storj token.252  
Now I am going to discuss the important parts of Howey and the Risk Capital Test in 
order to find the small difference. According to my analysis, Storj is an investment contract 
under the Risk Capital Test, but not under the Howey Test. 
The first prong of the Howey Test and Risk Capital Test can be easily satisfied for the 
Storj token. People can buy these Storj tokens from Binance which is one to of the token sales 
platform with Bitcoin, Ether, and other coins. According to Shavers case, Bitcoin investment can 
be considered as an investment of money.253 
The second prong of the Howey Test the common enterprise, and the second prong of the 
Risk Capital Test the business venture, can be easily found as well. The reason is that the Storj 
company pooled all of the people’s money for developing the application. Therefore; horizontal 
commonality and the business venture prong are satisfied in this case.  
The third prong of the Howey Test is that the investors should depend on the managerial 
efforts of others.254 Also, in the Risk Capital Test, if the investor does not have control over the 
enterprise, the test can be satisfied.255 In this case, the Storj team is responsible for developing 
the application. According to the whitepaper, the token holders do not have the right to control 
the Storj system. 
                                                 
250 Ori Oren, ICO's, DAO'S, and the SEC: A Partnership Solution, 2018 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 629 (2018) 
251 Storj Labs (BVI) Ltd. Terms of Token Sale available at 1 (May 18,2017) https://storj.io/sale-terms.pdf  
252 Id. 
253 Supra 2.4.1 Whether or not ICOs Satisfy the Investment of Money Prong? 
254 Supra 2.4.4 Whether or not ICOs Satisfy Managerial Efforts of Others Prong? 
255 Supra note to 1.4 Blue Sky Law and The Risk Capital Test. 
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The fourth prong for the Howey Test and the Risk Capital Test make a difference for 
Storj. As we discussed in the first chapter, while the Howey Test focuses on the expectation of 
essential profit, Risk Capital Test concentrates on some valuable benefits. 256   The Storj 
whitepaper highlighted that the buyers do not have any intention for investment, speculation and 
other financial purposes.257 Therefore, the company clarifies that there is no expectation of profit 
for the Storj token. So the token fails in this prong of Howey Test. However, for the Risk Capital 
Test, the result is not the same. The Storj company created these tokens for the purpose of 
allowing the purchaser to use the decentralized storage system. However, the token holders do 
not have the right to use these tokens now. They need to wait until early 2019. The company is 
still improving the system. Therefore, in terms of Risk Capital Test there is still some valuable 
benefits; therefore it an investment contract.258  
3.4 Whether Decentralized Autonomous Organization Tokens Can Be Considered a 
Security? 
This thesis will analyze the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (the DAO) tokens 
under securities tokens. The SEC prepared a report for the DAO tokens after the attackers hacked 
the DAO’s account on Ethereum Blockchain.259 People did not have a chance to start using the 
DAO tokens the way described in DAO’s whitepaper.260 However, the SEC took action against 
the DAO since it did not comply with U.S. securities law. The DAO tokens are one of the most 
                                                 
256 Id. 
257 Storj Labs (BVI) Ltd. Terms of Token Sale available at 4(May 18,2017) https://storj.io/sale-terms.pdf 
258 Supra Note the Risk Capital Test. 
259 Securities and Exchange Commission, Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 81207/ July 25/2017, 
Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO. (“DAO 
Report”) https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf 
260 Jentzsch, supra note 110.  
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leading matter regarding security tokens. While analyzing other tokens, the SEC cites from this 
decision.261 Therefore, it is crucial to analyze this token in a detailed manner. 
In May 2016, the DAO sold approximately 1.15 billion DAO tokens in exchange for a 
total of 12 million Ether which is a virtual currency (payment token) used on the Ethereum 
Blockchain.262 The DAO raised $150 million from this initial coin offering.263 
The DAO is one example of a Decentralized Autonomous Organization.264 Slock.it and 
co-founders of Slock.it created the DAO tokens.265 They sold DAO tokens to the public in order 
to use the raised money for the projects. The holders of DAO tokens expected earnings from the 
projects as a return on their investments on DAO tokens.266 Also, DAO token holders can resell 
their tokens on several web-based platforms that supported secondary trading. 267 
In the report, SEC did not analyze whether DAO was an investment company according 
to Investment Company Act of 1940. DAO did not start its business operations for funding 
projects. 268  If the business were started, there would be some other questions need to be 
answered as well.  
                                                 
261 See SEC v. Token Lot LLC, Lenny Kugel, Eli L. Lewitt, https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-
10543.pdf at 2. Also, SEC v. Sohrab Sharma, Robert Farkas, Raymond Trapani 18 Civ. 02909 NY, 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2018/comp-pr2018-70.pdf at 9. 
262 DAO Report at 2. 
263 Securities and Exchange Commission, Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 81207/ July 25/2017, 
Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, at 2. 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf  
264 DAO Whitepaper at 1. 
265 DAO Report at 1. 
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267 Securities and Exchange Commission, Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 81207/ July 25/2017, 
Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, at 1. 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf  
268 Securities and Exchange Commission, Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 81207/ July 25/2017, 
Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, at 1. 
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In DAO matter the organization used smart contracts for specific functions such as how 
to achieve quorum, how to vote, how to prepare the contracts and so on.269 The smart contract 
means that a computer-based application executes terms of the contract.270 The smart contracts 
satisfy contractual conditions, including but not limited to payment terms, liens, and 
confidentiality. 271 
The purchase of DAO tokens gives a right for the participant to receive rewards (this is 
almost same with dividends).272 The DAO token holders have the right to vote on contract 
proposals, such as proposing the project, funding the accepted project, distributing the 
anticipated earnings.273 The DAO tried to claim that the DAO was autonomous in these project 
proposals.274 The DAO alleged that smart contracts controlled the whole process.275 
DAO token holders have certain voting and ownership rights. If the DAO earns money 
from the projects, DAO token holders will vote whether use distribute the rewards to the token 
holders or fund new projects.276 
In this system, anyone had the right to buy DAO tokens as long as he or she had ETC in 
exchange. DAO token holders were able to sell their DAO tokens in various ways in the 
secondary market. After the offering period, the DAO promised that DAO tokens would be 
freely transferable on the Ethereum Blockchain.277 
                                                 
269 DAO Whitepaper at 11-31. 
270 Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts, 1994, 
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However, DAO’s code was vulnerable to the attacks. Attackers moved 3.6 million ETH 
from DAO’s Blockchain address to the attacker’s blockchain address. The DAO wanted to 
eradicate the consequences of the attack. Therefore, the DAO applied for Hard Fork to the 
Ethereum Blockchain. Ethereum Blockchain system accepted the Hard Fork, and the DAO 
received the tokens back.278 
In order to determine whether DAO tokens are securities, the SEC applied the Howey 
Test. However, the SEC did not apply every single prong of the Howey Test. In this case, SEC 
so much focused on managerial efforts of others. This concentration makes sense since the core 
of this case depends on this prong. The DAO system wanted to circumvent from SEC regulations 
by this prong. 
The DAO token holders invested their money in DAO system. Courts do not require the 
cash in order to find there is an investment contract.279 Also, in SEC v. Shavers, the court holds 
that investment of Bitcoin meets the requirement of Howey.280 Participants of DAO used ETH to 
make these contributions. 281   These contributions can satisfy the prong under investment 
contracts under Howey.  
DAO token holders anticipated getting some profits from their investment. There were 
several ways the token holders could expect getting profit. First of all, the holders could receive 
rewards.282 Also, through the successful projects, the value of the token would be increased.283 
Also, the token holders can get profit from the token market speculations.  
                                                 
278 SEC DAO Report 9-10. 
279 Uselton v. Comm. Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc 940 F. 2d 574.  
280 SEC v. Shavers, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110018. 
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The managerial efforts of others prong is the most challenging point in this case since 
DAO managers tried to give the power to the DAO token holders. In theory, the holders were 
going to decide what to do. 
The Supreme Court looks for whether the efforts made by the managers other than the 
investor are indisputably essential regarding failure or success of the enterprise.284 In this case, 
the SEC finds out that curators had significant rights on the proposals from the DAO token 
holders.285  
Also, the DAO system limited the voting rights of DAO token holders through review of 
the curators. The DAO tokens system some curators regulated which proposal will be voted. 
According to the white paper, they had considerable power on the proposals. Also, curators had 
power on the quorum; they had the power to reduce 50% every other week.286 According to 
supreme court even if the investors help to make the enterprise profitable, it may not be enough 
to shift managerial efforts of others prong to the investors.287 The help from the investors should 
be significant to shift this prong.288 The voting rights provided by the DAO did not provide them 
with meaningful control over the enterprise. The DAO token holders did not have the 
opportunity to find each other to make a decision as well. 289 
It can be concluded that if the DAO token was decentralized and DAO token holders 
were given the right of voting without restrictions, it would be possible that DAO token cannot 
satisfy Howey and therefore it cannot be considered as security. Since the managerial efforts of 
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others prong are crucial, the issuers of tokens can try to use this part to create token without 
securities law applications.  
On the other hand, SEC did not discuss the common enterprise prong. The SEC 
recognized that common enterprise as part of the investment contract. 290  Maybe SEC sees 
horizontal commonality and thinks that there is no need for discussion. It is evident from the 
incident that the DAO system pooled the investor’s money in a common enterprise. It means that 
each investor’s fortunes tied to the fortunes of other investors by the pooling assets.291  Therefore, 
in DAO token case there is a horizontal commonality.  
Some commentators do not agree with this conclusion. 292  According to DAO’s 
whitepaper, the token holders have the right to withhold their contributions if they do not want to 
invest in the project.293 The author argues that if the token holders do not choose to participate, 
the token holders will not share the profits and losses of the enterprise; therefore, there is not 
horizontal commonality. 294  However, if the token holders did not make any movement for 
accepting or declining, they will participate in the project. Therefore, I think that the DAO 
system has already pooled the investors’ money in its enterprise. 
DAO tokens can also satisfy the broad vertical commonality.295 One court found that 
vertical commonality can be found when the promoters provide advertisement, training, products, 
and the areas where product are sold.296 In the DAO matter, the founders advertised the DAO 
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tokens, explained how this system works, also the curators of DAO token approved the offers, 
open the offer to vote. Therefore, the broad vertical commonality can be found in the DAO.297 
Since there is no relationship between the investors and the founders after founders 
provided the code, it is hard to find narrow vertical commonality.298 For the most court, a lack of 
vertical commonality does not defeat common enterprise, since there is still a horizontal 
commonality.299 
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CHAPTER 4: SOLUTIONS FOR COMPANIES: HOW CAN COMPANIES ISSUE 
TOKENS WITHOUT BREAKING U.S. SECURITIES LAWS? 
Previously, we discussed whether tokens are securities. If tokens are securities, then the 
issuers should register those tokens as securities with the SEC. Otherwise, the company and the 
founders might face several severe consequences, such as debarment (a ban on working in the 
securities market), 300  disgorgement, 301  or civil penalties, 302  or a combination of these three. 
Therefore, if a person wants to raise funds in any offering that  is possibly a security, the person 
needs to register the offering with the SEC unless a statutory exemption applies or the person 
obtains a “no-action” letter. Otherwise, the person must structure the offering so that it does not 
fit under the 1933 Act’s definition of the term “security.”303   
In this chapter, I discuss the statutory exemptions available under the statutes enforced by 
the SEC, the gloss added by SEC regulations, and judicial interpretations of statutory and 
regulatory exemptions that might be available to token issuers. Then, after laying out 
requirements for potential exemptions, I use the requirements and limitations to describe a path 
                                                 
300 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-281, approved 12/1/18) states:  
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through which a token issuer might be able to avoid SEC registration without violating U.S. 
securities laws.  
4.1 Exemptions 
There are several exemptions from the 1933 Act.304 The SEC is authorized to promulgate 
the regulations to enable the 1933 Act.305 There are many reasons Congress wanted to give these 
exemptions. One of the most important reasons is that registration with the SEC is not an easy or 
fast process. The entrepreneur needs to hire attorneys who specialize in securities law, and it can 
take months to register tokens. Furthermore, the process is extremely expensive, often costing 
more than one million dollars. 306  Therefore, Congress passed these exemptions in order to 
protect capital formation.307 Exemptions provide lower costs for both the issuers and the buyers. 
Four statutory and regulatory exemptions may be available to issuers or tokens: Section 
4(a)(2),308 Regulation D,309 Regulation A,310 and Regulation Crowdfunding (CF).311 There are 
some differences between these exemptions. Persons planning offerings of tokens need to 
evaluate them before registering with the SEC. An issuer that seeks to rely on one or more of 
these exemptions will have the burden of proving that their offering complies with the specific 
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requirements or limitations put in place by Congress or the SEC on the exemption from 
registration.312 Since the issuer has the burden of proof for the exemption(s), the issuer should 
prepare a detailed evidentiary record to support its claim.313 
4.1.1 1933 Act Section 4(a)(2)  
According to the 1933 Act, Section 4(a)(2), transactions not involving any public 
offerings are exempt from SEC registration.314 The 1933 Act states, “The provisions of section 
77e of this title shall not apply to transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.”315 
According to this provision, offerings limited to “qualified investors” need not be registered with 
the SEC. Section 4(a)(2) exemption applies to both U.S. and non-U.S. private or public 
companies.316 
In order to understand what this exemption means, we need to focus on the term “public 
offerings.” There is no definition of the term “public offering” in the 1933 Act or the 1934 Act. 
Therefore, this thesis will analyze relevant case law and secondary sources, including SEC 
rulings.  
According to the case law, investors should be qualified for these investments. In SEC v. 
Ralston Purina, Co., the court held that investors should be able to “fend for themselves”.317 This 
phrase means that investors should be knowledgeable in the transaction, experienced regarding 
finance, and aware of the risks and merits.318  Qualified institutional buyers, such as banks, 
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savings and loan associations, accredited investors such as registered broker-dealers, and key 
employees can fend for themselves in terms of this prong.319  
An issuer who qualifies for a Section 4(a)(2) exemption will most likely need to register 
with the state securities office.320 Since each state has their own registration requirements, the 
issuer should seek counsel to see whether the instrument needs to be registered. 
If the issuer of the tokens sells the tokens to the public without any limitation, this 
offering will not fall for an exemption under Section 4(a)(2). For example, if the issuer of DAO 
tokens sold those tokens under this exemption, the buyers should know what kind of business 
they are going to engage in and what kind of risks and merits they are going to get from the 
business. 
Generally, in order to avoid selling exempted securities to non-eligible investors, the 
number of investors is limited.321 On the other hand, in token sales, the number of purchasers is 
generally high.322 However, with a computer coding system, the issuer can limit the number of 
buyers.  
General solicitation and advertising of the instrument are prohibited for this exemption.323 
If the issuer of tokens solicits or advertises the exempted securities on the internet, he or she 
cannot get benefit from this exemption. 
There are sale restrictions on these exempted securities. 324  Buyers of the restricted 
securities should hold these securities for at least one year before they attempt to resell them.325 
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It is one of the downsides for this exemption in terms of token sales. In general, the circulating 
supply for the tokens is high.326 This high circulating supply means that people who bought the 
tokens want to sell them to other people and that other people desire to buy the tokens. 
In conclusion, there are some obligations for getting benefit from the exemption under 
the 1933 Act, Section 4(a)(2). According to one commentator, it is hard for the token sellers to 
get benefit from this exemption since it is hard to control the buyers.327 According to another 
commentator, token issuers can provide more limited offerings to the smaller number of 
investors get an exemption from the SEC.328 This exemption can be achieved by the coding 
systems. Also, the best thing with this exemption is that there is no dollar limitation like 
Regulation A, Regulation Crowdfunding, and Regulation D.   
4.1.2 Regulation D 
The token issuers can apply for the Regulation D exemption.329 Regulation D has three 
different exemptions in it. These exemptions are set out under Rules 504, 330  506(b),331  and 
506(c).332  The SEC promulgates these rules.333   
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For Rule 504, there is a five million dollar limitation for every year.334 Offerings should 
not exceed this amount in order to get benefit from this exemption. There is no limitation for the 
investor qualifications in this rule.335 However, there are resale restrictions on the exemption.336 
Also, the offering most likely needs to be registered or qualified for the exemption under state 
law.337 
For Rule 506(b), there is no dollar limitation on the size of the offering.338 If there are 
“accredited purchasers,” 339  there is no limitation on the number of investors. 340  For the 
accredited purchasers, the issuer shall reasonably believe that the investors are accredited.341 
Other than accredited purchasers, only 35 purchasers can buy these exempted securities. 342 The 
issuers shall furnish specific information for the non-accredited investors.343 There is a resale 
restriction for this exemption. The offerings exempted under Rule 506(b) are potentially not to 
be registered to the states.344 
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For Rule 506(c), there is no limit to the size of the offering.345 Only accredited investors 
can buy these securities. Issuers of the token must reasonably believe that the investor is 
accredited. Moreover, investors should take reasonable steps to verify all investors are 
accredited.346 This exemption also has resale restrictions. Buyers should hold these securities for 
six months if the issuer is the reporting company or one year if the issuer is a non-reporting 
company. Since only accredited investors can buy this security, there is no need for furnishing 
certain information. Also, under Rule 506(c) there is most likely no state registration 
requirement.347   
According to rule 504, 506(b), and 506(c) investors have resale restrictions. In the token 
sales, people generally buy and sell quickly in a short time. Also, restrictions for the investors 
(being “accredited investors”348 or a limited number of non-accredited investors) prevent the 
customers from buying certain utility tokens.349 With this restriction, the intended buyers cannot 
achieve certain services that rely on the tokens. 
Reselling these exempted utilities could be a problem for the investors. Investors should 
wait six months or one year.350 Even if these are the backsides, the SEC can oversee what is 
going on with the token sales. In this way, the SEC can protect the investors. 
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349 Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the Democratization 
of Public Capital Markets 77 (Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 527; Univ. of Tenn. Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 338, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3048104.  
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Filecoin can be the leading token for this exemption, specifically for Rule 506(c). On 
August 25, 2017, the company filed form D, which is an exemption application form.351 In the 
application, the company chooses to get benefit from Rule 506(c).352 Therefore, the company 
promised to sell the tokens to the accredited investors and promised to verify the accredited 
investors’ information.353 The company did not have a dollar limitation for this fundraising. 
Filecoin collected 257 million dollars from the token sale.354 Regulation 506(c) can be one of the 
best solutions for companies that want to sell their product to accredited investors without dollar 
limitation. 
4.1.3 Regulation A 
Regulation A can be another solution for the ICO issuers.355 The best part of Regulation 
A is that there are no resale restrictions, unlike Regulation D and Regulation CF. 356  For 
Regulation A, issuers can raise up to 20 million dollars for the first tier,357 and 50 million dollars 
for the second tier.358 For the first tier, there is no specific requirement for the investors; however, 
for the second tier, there are some restrictions for unaccredited investors. 
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For the first tier, the issuer still most likely needs to register or qualify for the exemption 
in the state he or she wants to sell the securities.359 On the other hand, there is most likely no 
state registration requirement for the second tier.360 Even if the issuers do not have to register for 
the second tier, they need to comply with state filing fees and antifraud provisions.361 The issuer 
should check whether he or she needs to register with the specific state before selling the 
securities. 
Some commentators consider Regulation A as a mini-IPO.362 Therefore, the amount of 
money companies spend on getting a Regulation A exemption could be very high. According to 
one estimate, Regulation A offerings cost around $350,000.363 
On the other hand, some commentators believe that Regulation A is better than 
Regulation D for token issuers.364 The specific resale restrictions for Regulation D make it harder 
for the issuers and first-time investors to sell the tokens. Also, Regulation A is better than 
Regulation D in terms of tokens’ fast trade volume. 
The average ICOs’ size is around 25 million dollars in 2017. 365  Taking this into 
consideration, many token issuers can get benefit from the Regulation A exemption. However, if 
we compare the Regulation A exemption experience with one of the largest token sales, such as 
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the DAO which raised $150 million, the maximum amount that can be raised would be not 
enough.  
4.1.4 Regulation Crowdfunding 
Regulation Crowdfunding can be another solution for token issuers.366 The issuers can 
only raise up to $1,070,000 with this exemption during each year.367 There are certain limitations 
on the amount that the individuals can participate in crowdfunding.368 If the individual investor’s 
annual income or net worth is under the $100,000, that individual can participate only up to 
$2,000 or 5% of annual income.369 If the investor’s annual income is higher than $100,000, the 
investor can contribute 10% of its annual income.370 
Issuers shall use the registered funding portal or SEC-registered broker or dealers.371  
Also, there are several resale restrictions for crowdfunding.372  
If the issuers qualify under the crowdfunding exemption, the security that the issuer 
offers will most likely be exempt from state registration. 373  It would lower the cost of the 
registration process. 
Some authors state that the crowdfunding exemption is not a good solution for initial coin 
offerings.374 One million dollars may not be enough for the average initial coin offerings.375 
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Second, there are resale restrictions for the buyers. Third, there is a specific intermediary 
requirement for regulation crowdfunding. The author states that blockchain eliminates the need 
for an intermediary since everything is recorded on the ledger.376 I do not agree with this opinion 
because a registered intermediary can also create a blockchain ledger to manage crowdfunding 
processes. 
On the other hand, there are several positive aspects of regulation crowdfunding. There is 
no restriction in the regulation that states only accredited investors, or a limited number of 
accredited investors, can participate.377 Also, these tokens will most likely be exempted from the 
state registration requirement.378 Depending on the size of the initial coin offerings, issuers can 
choose to get this exemption.  
4.2 Decentralization of Managerial Efforts of Others 
We discussed in the exemption part that if the token is a security what exemptions the 
issuers could get. In this part, we will focus on how we can create a token without it being a 
security in light of the SEC and the Courts’ decisions. The companies which issue the tokens can 
structure their tokens in a little bit different way. 
 As I discussed in the DAO decision, the SEC mainly focused on whether curators used 
the managerial efforts in the company. 379  The SEC found out that DAO’s curators used 
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managerial authority on the business.380 How can we create tokens without having managerial 
efforts from the group or individuals? The answer comes with the new technology: 
decentralization of the decision-making mechanism. 
The DAO wanted to shift the managerial authority to the token owners, which almost hit 
the right point. However, the white paper mentioned that the company wants to protect the 
investors from the majority attacks and, therefore, they hired curators.381 The power of curators 
was very high.382 They had the power to choose which proposed agreement would be whitelisted 
and offered to the DAO token holders. Also, they had the right to decide how many proposals 
would be submitted to the system.383  
Let’s imagine the DAO fully decentralized the managerial efforts to all token holders. In 
the first moment, when token holders make decisions, there would be no responsible person or 
group for these managerial efforts. Therefore, there would be no responsible person to bear the 
managerial efforts of others prong in the first phase. However, after the project is selected, there 
will be one person or group who will be responsible for the rest of the managerial efforts. In this 
scenario, DAO tokens cannot be considered as a security. However, after the people raise funds 
to individual projects, there would be one person or group who would take responsibility for the 
project. Then, that project could be an investment contract; therefore, it would be a security. 
4.3 Completely Functional Utility Token Solution for the Pre-Functional Utility Tokens 
As we discussed in the second chapter, the intended purpose of the utility tokens is that 
they are designed to provide access for products or services.384 In short, if the token issuers 
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promise to provide this access after a while, the token can be considered as pre-functional. On 
the other hand, if the issuer gives all the rights and services to the token holders at the time of 
sale, there is a fully-functional utility token. 
Though pre-functional utility token issuers promise that they are going to develop the 
project, and one day the token holders will get the benefit, this promise cannot stop the SEC and 
Courts from deciding that pre-functional utility tokens are not securities.385 As we mentioned in 
Munchee and Storj tokens, pre-functional utility tokens are likely to be considered a security.386 
The reason is that people have an expectation of profit from the managerial efforts of the token 
developer. The token holders believe that the company or the group will develop the application. 
Therefore, his or her investment becomes more valuable.387 Especially under the Risk Capital 
Test, the risk is higher for the investor who invests his or her money into the pre-functional 
utility tokens.388  
Therefore, companies should not try to launch an initial coin offering until they are 
confident that the token has real functions in it. This suggestion is for companies that want to 
launch real utility tokens, but did not make the token ready for use. If the company defrauds 
investors, blue sky law will stop the issuers at a certain point.389  
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CONCLUSION 
Securities law is a legal field that is important for both federal and state governments. In 
1911, Kansas started to regulate securities in order to protect its agriculturists from the wealthy 
industrialists. In 1933, the federal government adopted and expanded the application area of 
securities law. Although the federal government has made many decisions and continues to have 
primary control in securities law, states still have the power to enforce states’ securities 
regulations within their borders.390  
Both federal courts and federal administrative institutions, as well as state courts and state 
administrative bodies, analyze ICOs with different tests. The federal government and the 
majority of states implement the Howey Test to determine whether ICOs are securities. States 
that do not use the Howey Test apply the Risk Capital Test to ICOs instead, and they act 
according to the results. The primary purpose of the states is to record securities that are being 
sold in their region and to prevent fraud. Recently, North Dakota made many decisions on ICOs 
after the securities commission found out about illegal activities occurring within the state that 
had caused significant harm to investors.391 
Since this paper found that the majority of ICOs remain in the area of securities law, 
entrepreneurs must comply with the rules of this field. Until now, crypto entrepreneurs wanted to 
stay outside of securities law because the registration process is time-consuming and requires 
them to spend a considerable amount of money. Therefore, I focused on the registration 
exemptions and structure of the tokens to make the registration process easier and more 
accessible to entrepreneurs.392 
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After deciding if a token is a security, there are ways for the issuers to comply with 
securities law. First, the issuer can register these tokens before selling them to the public. I did 
not discuss this option in this paper since many entrepreneurs do not favor this solution. Second, 
the issuer can apply for an exemption from registration. All exemptions have their own 
advantages and disadvantages. 
The 1933 Act Section 4(a)2 and Regulation D Rule 506 have no limitation regarding the 
amount raised for companies. However, Regulation D Rule 504 has an upper limit of 5 million 
dollars, and Regulation A Tier I, Regulation A Tier II, and Regulation CF have upper limits of 
20 million, 50 million, and 1.07 million dollars, respectively. Regulation D Rule 504 and 
Regulation A are the only exemptions with no resale restrictions. Other exemptions have six 
month or one-year exemptions, depending on the status of the issuers. If the issuer is the 
reporting company, then the restrictions are just for six months; otherwise, the resale restrictions 
are for one year. Regulation CF, Regulation A Tier I, and Regulation D Rule 506 generally do 
not need to be registered with the state securities office. However, 1933 Act Section 4(a)(2), 
Regulation D Rule 504, and Regulation A Tier II will most likely need to be registered with the 
state securities office. Token issuers should assess the benefits of the exemptions and apply for 
them with the SEC accordingly. In so doing, the obligations of the state for the registration or 
notification should also be reviewed, and these obligations must be fulfilled.393  
Although it may be difficult to realize, issuers may be relieved of these obligations by 
going beyond the application of securities law. One of the solutions for remaining outside of 
securities law would be the decentralization of the decision-making mechanism to the investors. 
In this way, the investors will have control over the company. Therefore, the managerial efforts 
of others prong will shift to the investors. However, it is better for the investors to keep in mind 
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that, even if the DAO were to try this prong, the company would fail since there were curators 
who had the power to publish the offers according to their judgment. 394 
Issuers may market their fully-functional tokens rather than unfinished projects. Many 
utility tokens were launched to develop new projects. For example, it is possible for the Storj 
token to be an investment contract under the Risk Capital Test, even if it does not offer a profit. 
The reason behind this is that issuers made the investors risk their money on unfinished projects. 
Therefore, if the issuer produces fully-functional utility tokens, there will be no investment 
contracts that investors will have to put at risk.395 
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